Successful economies rely upon effective lawmaking. Representatives must be effective legislators—able to craft and pass new laws—and voters must choose to(re)elect these effective legislators, particularly when circumstances demand new laws. Analyzing election outcomes from the U.S. House of Representatives, legislators’ effectiveness, and exogenous increases in import competition from China between 2002 and 2010, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts exposed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to continue to be elected comparedto less effective legislators.

Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were less likely to continueto be elected compared to less effective legislators. We interpret and provide evidence that this result is driven by trade shock exposure affecting whether voters demandpolicy change and, in turn, voters’ decisions to (re)elect more or less effective legislators.

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